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J O H N L A U B E R 
H E continuing objections to Jane Austen's novels have 
nowhere been summed up more succintly or more tellingly 
than by Emerson (not a likely reader of Jane Austen, one 
would have thought!) in his Journal: her novels are "vulgar in 
tone, sterile in invention, imprisoned in the wretched 
conventions of English society, without genius, wit or 
knowledge of the world. Never was life so pinched and narrow." 
Her only subject, he goes on, is "marriageableness."1 That final 
comment smacks of sexism — because "marriageableness" is 
presumably of greater concern to women than to men, therefore 
it cannot be a subject of primary importance — but leaving that 
point aside, while Emerson's language seems somewhat dated, 
his attitudes do not. The Romantic mind, whether in the 
nineteenth century or the twentieth, has difficulty in coming to 
terms with Jane Austen's work. From the viewpoint of extreme 
Romanticism (flourishing vigorously a century after Emerson) 
social conventions are necessarily wretched, because they 
repress the human spirit, and a life lived in obedience to them 
cannot be anything but "pinched and narrow." 
A modern critic reinforces the argument: "Comedy exhibits 
the individual as eccentric and makes society triumph over him. 
It thus tends to a realistic form with a strongly satiric social 
emphasis which is not particularly congenial to Romanticism. 
Jane Austen's novels are an example of such comedy."2 But 
comedy can be a liberating art as well as a corrective one, and 
such a generalization breaks down immediately when applied. 
Elizabeth Bennet is certainly considered eccentric by Miss 
Bingley or Lady Catherine de Bourgh, but she triumphs over 
them instead of being forced to conform to their standards. In 
fact, with the exception of Marianne Dashwood, the Jane 
Austen heroine always triumphs over society, or to speak more 
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precisely, within it. She triumphs by discovering, asserting, and 
finally satisfying her own needs and desires, and by protecting 
her integrity against hostile pressures. This kind of success is 
possible within the limits of social convention because those 
limits are not as constrictive as they may seem. While the Lady 
Catherines, the petty tyrants and repressers of individuality, 
claim to speak for society, in fact they do not. They are part of it, 
but not the whole, and because they are not, "the upstart 
pretensions of a young woman without family, connections, or 
fortune"3 can be realized. To accept Lady Catherine's own 
evaluation of her authority, as Mr. Collins and Sir William 
Lucas do, is the mark of a fool. 
The social world of Jane Austen's novels is ordinarily the 
world of the village or the country house, of Highbury and of 
Mansfield Park. This is the world of her personal experience, 
and much has been said about its narrow scope. Yet this 
narrowness may be a necessary condition for her comedy. 
Comedy is play, and "All play moves and has its being within a 
playground marked off beforehand either materially or 
ideally."4 The "playground" of each novel is not only 
geographical and social; it is delimited also by the firm order of 
syntax and vocabulary, and by constantly felt governing 
principles, both of morals and of manners. The field on which the 
heroine plays for a desirable marriage is marked off precisely 
and the rules are clear — what pleasure would there be for 
either participant or spectator in a game without rules? "The 
conflict with the world whereby a living being maintains its own 
complex organic unity is a delightful encounter...The feeling of 
comedy is a feeling of heightened vitality, of challenged wit and 
will."6 Our response to Jane Austen is frequently a sense of 
exhilaration at the heroine's successful exertion of her wit and 
will to overcome these challenges, and this response in itself is 
proof that the life which the novels present is far from being 
"pinched and narrow." (This sense of heightened vitality 
constitutes what one might call the therapeutic value of the 
novels.) 
The modern reader is likely to be struck not only by the 
smallness of the society presented, but by its intimacy. It is a 
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world of compulsory closeness in which everyone knows, or at 
least knows about and talks about, everyone else, a world in 
which "every man is surrounded by a neighbourhood of 
voluntary spies."6 There is no real bitterness in that statement, 
rather an ironic acceptance of one of the conditions of life. 
Escape is impossible; no matter how difficult relations with a 
neighbour may be, they must continue on some basis or other. So 
the Dashwoods must submit to being bored by the Middletons, 
so Fanny Price cannot avoid the disagreeable attentions of 
Henry Crawford, so Emma and Harriet must be painfully 
embarrassed by meeting Mr. Elton after the collapse of Emma's 
disastrous attempt to capture him for Harriet. "Their being 
fixed, so absolutely fixed, in the same place, was bad for each, for 
all three. Not one of them had the power of removal, or of 
effecting any material change of society. They must encounter 
each other and make the best of it" (Emma, p. 143). From such 
encounters can spring intense drama when the mask of civility 
is finally thrown off and anger speaks directly, as in Emma's 
insult to Miss Bates at Box Hill or Elton's cruelty to Harriet at 
the ball. Freedom of movement is unknown to Jane Austen's 
women (even Mary Crawford, rich and unattached, must 
establish herself in a substitute home with relatives), and 
severely limited for her men by family ties, the sense of duty, 
and local attachment. Knightley is inconceivable without 
Don well Abbey; it is part of his identity. The solidity of Darcy's 
character, in contrast to the flightiness of Bingley, arises to a 
considerable degree from his ownership of Pemberley, whereas 
Bingley is free to settle wherever he will and remove himself 
whenever he pleases. 
But the world of the heroines is even narrower then these 
limits of place would suggest. Highbury is small enough, but 
Emma's range of acquaintance is limited to a fraction of the 
village, the "respectable" professional and commercial families. 
Relations of a kind are also possible with the very poor, who can 
receive charity, but with the remainder she has no meeting 
ground. Social value in such a world appears to depend on 
money and rank, although the claims of the two may conflict. 
Except in Emma, the heroine invariably loves a man who is 
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either above or beneath her (usually above) in one or both of 
these attributes. Hence the social obstacles which must be 
overcome, providing much of the action of the novel. 
Finally, both behavior and belief seem to be tightly 
controlled. Manners and morals are firmly established; society 
knows what is right and enforces its code, particularly on 
women. (The code is enforced largely by women as well.) 
Fundamental beliefs concerning religion, morality and the 
social order may sometimes be violated or ignored, but they are 
not questioned. 
In such a society, to an unsympathetic mind freedom might 
well seem impossible, and rebellion or slavery to convention the 
only alternatives. And yet, the novels demonstrate, significant 
possibilities for free action exist. "There is one thing, Emma, 
that a man can always do, if he chuses, and that is, his duty," 
says Knightley (Emma, p. 146). And women too, we might add. 
Right action, then, is always possible, and a knowledge of what 
is right cannot be dictated by convention, for sometimes moral 
and worldly principles clash; it must depend finally on 
individual judgment based on understanding of one's self and 
others and on a free choice of principle over prudence. More 
important still, in the decisive choice of a heroine's life, the 
choice of a husband, a limited freedom is possible — and not 
merely the freedom to refuse, as Elizabeth Bennet or Anne 
Elliot demonstrate. (We must resist the familiar romantic 
prejudice that a limited freedom is equivalent to no freedom at 
all.) 
Unlike some of her romantic contemporaries, Jane Austen 
never looks to an idealized past or an apocalyptic future. The 
novels accept the necessity of social controls without regret or 
cynicism, and recognize their positive value in shaping and 
giving meaning to life (without them we would waste ourselves 
in the pursuit of every transient impulse); they accept without 
question the particular society of her time and place. In an 
England threatened not only by a hostile France but by 
subversive ideologies and social upheaval, Jane Austen's work 
must have seemed to contemporary readers a rock against the 
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waves of revolution, assuring them that their society was not 
only irremovably there, but that it was ordered, comprehensible, 
and good.7 Good not only because it provided an indispensable 
structure for individual human lives, but because, as the novels 
demonstrate, it allowed for the exercise of free choice and action, 
thereby increasing the possibilities of one's life. 
In her novels, men and women find their happiness in the 
social world, or find it not at all. But as we have seen, this world 
is not a monolith composed of Lady Catherines. Tightly 
structured as it appears, it still leaves a certain space to each 
individual, to make of it what he or she will. (It is precisely this 
insistence on the possibility and importance of freedom that 
distinguishes Jane Austen's work from the "anti-Jacobin" novel 
of the time.) This question of the possibility of free choice and 
free action in apparently closed situations is a major concern of 
the novels. The discovery and exploration of these possibilities 
is carried out by the heroines — most notably Elizabeth Bennet, 
which may account for the unique vitality of that heroine and of 
the novel in which she appears. 
Freedom in itself, absolute freedom regardless of the use 
made of it — this obviously is not a value of the novels. The 
questions always arises: "Freedom for what?" Henry Crawford 
might seem to be the freest character in Jane Austen's novels. 
Intelligent, agreeable, wealthy, of good birth, orphaned, and 
unrestricted by any particular regard for principles and 
decorum — surely Crawford can do just what he will and only 
what he will. In fact, all his actions are either trivial or 
positively hurtful, both to himself and others. Mr. Yates, in the 
same novel, stands for absolute freedom and defiance of the 
tyrannical authority of morality and of parents — but Yates is 
so patently a fool that no reader is likely to take his side even 
against the heavy authority of Sir Thomas Bertram. There are 
other apostles of freedom in the novels — Lydia Bennet (by her 
actions) and Sir Edward Denham of Sanditon, but both are 
discredited. Lydia's total disregard for both morality and 
decorum brings great suffering and the possibility of social 
disgrace upon her family, and she throws away her own life in a 
loveless marriage. ("His affection for her soon sunk into 
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indifference; her's lasted a little longer" —Pride and Prejudice, 
p. 387). Her independence of convention results from total 
thoughtlessness, a blank refusal to consider the consequences of 
her own actions. Sir Edward's challenge to the conventions is 
potentially more dangerous, based on (perverted) principle 
rather than mere obedience to impulse. Sir Edward is an 
ideologue of passion (of "high Conceptions, Unbounded Views, 
illimitable Ardour, indomtible Decision." — Minor Works, p. 
403). Sir Edward is a fool, however, a Quixote in reverse 
(reading novels has inspired him to play the villain), and he 
offers no real threat to society. Clara Brereton, whom he has 
decided to seduce, "saw through him and had not the least 
intention of being seduced" (Minor Works, p. 405). Sir Edward's 
apparent freedom, in fact, might be considered as exactly the 
opposite; he is as rule-bound as any moralist could be. Because 
Clara is "young, lovely & dependant" he must seduce her; "Her 
situation in every way called for it" (Minor Works, p. 405). The 
potential danger of Sir Edward's reasoned subversion of 
morality is cancelled by his dubious folly. 
If freedom is defined as defiance of moral principle, of 
decorum, of parental authority, then plainly the novels reject it 
by revealing with convincing logic its absurd or disastrous 
consequences. This "freedom" is invariably used for trivial, 
harmful, or self-defeating purposes. And although the point is 
not made explicitly (to do so would be most uncharacteristic for 
Jane Austen), it is perhaps implied that the freedom which 
consists in obedience to every impulse might be the worst 
slavery. Jane Austen, as a true novelist, is essentially a 
pragmatisti obedience to principle is justified, and violation of it 
condemned, by the results. The value of freedom, then, is 
potential rather than intrinsic, depending entirely on the use 
that is made of it. 
In Jane Austen's novels the oppressive power of society is 
likely to be embodied in the "great lady" (made great by money 
and rank). Lady Catherine is the most conspicuous example, but 
the type occurs through the works, from the juvenile "A 
Collection of Letters" ("It is not my way to find fault with people 
because they are poor, for I always think they are more to be 
JANE AUSTEN AND THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM 83 
despised and pitied than blamed for it" — Minor Works, p. 157) 
to Lady Denham of Sanditon, vigorously exercising the power of 
her purse over Sir Edward Denham and Clara Brereton. One 
remembers also Mrs. Churchill, whose presence is so strongly 
felt in Emma and whose death at last permits Frank Churchill 
to reveal his engagement to Jane Fairfax. (General Tilney in 
Northanger Abbey, as unreasonable and arbitrarily despotic as 
any, plays a male version of the role.) The most brutally 
tyrannical of them all is undoubtedly Mrs. Ferrars oí Sense and 
Sensibility, whose ferocity toward a disobedient son reaches the 
limits of comedy: "His own two thousand pounds she protested 
should be his all; she would never see him again; and so far 
would she be from affording him the smallest assistance, that if 
he were to enter any profession with a view of better support, she 
would do all in her power to prevent his advancing in it" (Sense 
and Sensibility, p. 267). But her anger is futile and its result is 
only to injure her own pride when she transfers Edward's 
inheritance to his brother Robert and thus enables Robert to 
marry the despised Lucy Steele. In Jane Austen's comic world, 
tyranny is always stupid. 
The great ladies are essentially ridiculous. There is an 
absurdity in the image of Lady Catherine scolding her villagers 
into harmony and contentment, that prevents the reader from 
considering her a serious threat. She can be defeated by anyone 
who has the wit to recognize the emptiness of her pretensions 
and to resist her commands. After all, her power is limited; it is 
only to herself and a few fools that she embodies Society. 
Elizabeth knows better. When Lady Catherine charges that 
"you are determined to ruin [Darcy] in the opinion of his friends, 
and make him the contempt of the world," she is quite sure that 
"the world in general would have too much sense to join in the 
scorn" (Pride and Prejudice, p. 358). 
The role of the great lady is played most vigorously and 
viciously by Mrs. Norris in relation to Fanny Price. Although 
not a great lady in the literal sense, she outdoes the great in 
eager officiousness and petty tyranny, made more oppressive by 
her intimate relation to Fanny. Of all Jane Austen's novels, 
Mansfield Park is closest to the fairy-tale pattern (Fanny 
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making an admirable Cinderella), and Mrs. Norris is the model 
of a wicked stepmother — the position that she actually fills, 
with Lady Bertram's abdication of all responsibilities. She is an 
archetypal figure who is yet completely individualized and 
thoroughly credible, so credible, in fact, that she becomes the 
most hateful of Jane Austen's characters. But although she can 
and does render Fanny unhappy, and provides an indispensable 
testing of character, she does not really block Fanny's winning 
of Edmund — rather, she aids it, as her cruelty arouses 
Edmund's sympathy for Fanny. Although she does great harm 
to Maria Bertram, in regard to the heroine she is finally as 
ineffectual as Lady Catherine toward Elizabeth Bennet. 
The great lady threatens to frustrate the desires of the 
heroine and hero. In Emma there can be no such role in relation 
to Emma Woodhouse and Mrs. Knightley — the most 
influential woman and man in their social world. There is no 
conflict between Emma and her society; there is no question of 
society interposing any barrier between her and whatever she 
might desire. Unlike any of the other heroines, Emma herself 
has social authority, and this authority proves dangerous to 
herself and others. Given her fondness for flattery (Harriet 
Smith's ignorance constitutes, as Knightley points out, the most 
insidious and delightful flattery), her love of being "useful" to 
her social inferiors and her passion for matchmaking, she comes 
close to being a domineering, officious great lady herself. Her 
consummate egotism is more dangerous than open tyranny — 
Harriet is almost literally devoured: "She read the concluding 
lines [of Elton's charade] and was all flutter and happiness. She 
was not wanted to speak. It was enough for her to feel. Emma 
spoke for her" (Emma, p. 72). That she is capable of social 
tyranny, her insult to Miss Bates reveals. Perhaps only her 
marriage to Knightley prevents Emma from becoming the Lady 
Catherine of Highbury. 
The novel that deals most directly and continuously with the 
issue of freedom is Sense and Sensibility. Here Jane Austen 
created a heroine whom Emerson himself could have admired, 
who shares his disgust at the "wretched conventions" of English 
society. Marianne Dashwood is an extreme romantic, claiming 
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total freedom of action and of self-expression, regardless of 
social inhibitions. Her "sensibility" is not simply a matter of 
swoons and raptures, like those undergone by the heroines of 
the juvenile Love and Friendship; rather it is a comprehensive 
attitude toward life, involving several distinct yet inseparable 
elements. The capacity to feel, deeply and immediately, 
becomes the criterion of personal value. Correspondingly, the 
value of any experience — viewing a landscape, listening to 
music, conversation — depends entirely on the intensity of 
feeling which it arouses. Feeling must be expressed fully and 
immediately, without regard for "manners" and "decorum". The 
social lie is rejected under any circumstances; if Marianne 
cannot express her feelings, she withdraws into silence or 
music. Right action is to be determined not by principle but by 
impulse, intuition, feeling. 
For her sister Elinor, "the pleasantness of an employment 
does not always evince its propriety." For Marianne, "On the 
contrary, nothing can be a strong proof of it . . . for if there had 
been any real impropriety in what I did, I should have been 
sensible of i t . . . and . . . could have had no pleasure" (Sense 
and Sensibility, p. 68). The differences between the ethic of 
principle and the ethic of feeling cannot be reconciled. Unlike 
any other character in the novels (the farcical Sir Edward 
Denham hardly makes an exception), Marianne challenges the 
fundamental values of her fictional society and also, from all 
available evidence, of Jane Austen herself. Such a principled 
rejection of the authority of principle is more threatening to 
society than the impulsive acts of any of the semirakes who are 
Jane Austen's anti-heroes. No compromise, no triumph within 
the system is possible, and Marianne must finally submit. 
The novel demonstrates beyond any doubt the disadvantages 
of sensibility — its intolerance of human differences, the 
inconvenience and actual distress which it may cause. 
Marianne is unreasonably difficult in society: "It was 
impossible for her to say what she did not feel . . . and upon 
Elinor, therefore, the whole task of telling lies when politeness 
required it, always fell" (Sense and Sensibility, p. 122). So when 
Lucy Steele observes "What a sweet woman Lady Middleton 
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is!", Elinor "did her best when thus called on, by speaking of 
Lady Middleton with more warmth than she felt." But is there 
any real need for this particular lie? Why must Elinor agree that 
the insipid Lady Middleton is a sweet woman? These little 
dishonesties come too easily, and Elinor is made too conscious of 
the opinions of the Steeles — as if their opinion really mattered. 
Such consciousness becomes, as Marianne calls it, 
"subservience". 
" 'But I thought it was right, Elinor,' said Marianne, 'to be guided 
wholly by the opinion of other people. I thought our judgments were 
given us merely to be subservient to those of our neighbours. This has 
always been your doctrine, I am sure.' 
'No, Marianne, never. My doctrine has never aimed at the subjection of 
the understanding. All I have ever attempted to influence has been the 
behavior.' " (Sense and Sensibility, pp. 93-4). 
But behavior and understanding are not so easily separated, 
and in a novel one must judge characters by their behavior 
(including their own words) because finally there is nothing 
else. Elinor is the most passive of the Jane Austen heroines, 
much more so than Fanny Price, who makes a series of heroic 
refusals (refusing to act in Lovers' Vows, refusing Henry 
Crawford's proposal, refusing the demand of Sir Thomas 
Bertram that she accept Crawford). Elinor does not act, she does 
not refuse, she only endures, and although we may realize (as a 
piece of abstract knowledge) that such endurance must be 
painful, that kind of knowledge is not enough. Because Elinor is 
never shown to feel, we feel very little interest in her or 
sympathy for her situation. It is no use for the author to assure 
us in the first chapter that "She had an excellent heart; her 
dispositions were affectionate, and her feelings were strong, but 
she knew how to govern them" (Sense and Sensibility, p. 6). 
They are governed so thoroughly that we get no proof of their 
existence. Jane Austen undertook to create a heroine who would 
serve as an embodiment of propriety, principle, prudence, 
decorum and reserve, displaying these qualities under all 
circumstances, and who would nevertheless convince us that 
"she had an excellent heart, her dispositions were affectionate, 
and her feelings were strong." She fails, because the qualities 
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attributed to Elinor are contradicted by those she actually 
displays. 
"Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak 
enough to be restrained;" writes Blake in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell, "and the restrainer or reason usurps its place 
and governs the unwilling. And being restrain'd, it by degrees 
becomes passive, till it is only the shadow of desire." Elinor 
appears to belong to this class: "Even now her self-command is 
invariable. When is she dejected or melancholy? When does she 
try to avoid society, or appear restless and dissatisfied in it?" 
(Sense and Sensibility, p. 39), remarks Marianne after Elinor 
has lost her home and apparently her lover, and this is exactly 
the difficulty. Invariable self-command is Elinor's most 
distinctive quality, and it necessarily prevents her from 
displaying the strength of feeling which must be demonstrated 
if her sense is to seem a desirable alternative to Marianne's 
sensibility, and her regard for convention a reasoned 
compliance rather than "subservience." "The trouble is not 
merely that, for all the author's artistic tact, the cumbrous 
framework and enforced contrasts remain. . . . Marianne is 
drawn with strong feelings which the reader is accustomed to 
sympathize with. . . . Right or wrong, she has our sympathy 
. . . our responses to her are outside Jane Austen's control."8 
Inevitably — most readers have a bias toward feeling and 
freedom, even if they never claim as much as Marianne. The 
author has committed the error, fatal to her didactic purpose, of 
seeming to define "sense" as "constraint". 
It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the importance of 
freedom in Pride and Prejudice and Persuasion. No one is likely 
to deny that Elizabeth Bennet is a free spirit or that this 
freedom, deriving from her intelligence and vitality rather than 
lack of principle, and expressing itself through her iconoclastic 
wit and self-assertion, is the source of her unique charm. It 
naturally gives offence to those whose pretensions are hollow, or 
who are enslaved by convention. "To walk three miles . . . 
above her ankles in dirt, and alone, what could she mean by it? It 
seems to me to show an abominable sort of conceited 
independence, a most country town indifference to decorum" 
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{Pride and Prejudice, p. 36). But any Austen character who 
condemns independence in itself becomes, at least momentarily, 
a fool (as his or her language demonstrates). By comic justice, it 
is precisely Elizabeth's independence which fascinates Darcy 
(disgusted with the servility of Miss Bingley and her like); 
Darcy's fascination establishes his own worth and entitles him 
to the position of hero. 
Anne Elliot is the only Jane Austen heroine who actually 
yields to social pressure, or "persuasion", to the extent of 
breaking her engagement with the hero. By the time the novel 
begins, she has come to realize and regret her mistake: "How 
eloquent could Anne Elliot have been . . . on the side of early 
warm attachment, and cheerful confidence in futurity . . . She 
had been forced into prudence in her youth, she learned romance 
as she grew older — the natural sequel of an unnatural 
beginning" (Persuasion, p. 30). Extreme prudence in youth — 
the prudence of an Elinor Dashwood, for instance — has now 
become "an unnatural beginning." 
The Jane Austen heroine, then, possesses a substantial 
(though of course limited) freedom, without exercising which 
she could win neither the hero nor the sympathy and interest of 
the reader. Thus the exhilaration of readingPrcde and Prejudice 
results in large part from our delight in seeing the heroine rise 
superior to social barriers and prejudices. But in Mansfield Park 
we find a heroine, and a novel, which seem to contradict all that 
has just been said, and a critical hypothesis about Jane Austen's 
work which is flatly contradicted by one of her major novels 
cannot be of much use. Even sympathetic readers have found in 
Mansfield Park a positive bias against freedom and in favor of 
purely conventional behavior: "Its impulse is not to forgive, but 
to condemn. Its praise is not for social freedom but for social 
stasis."9 Fanny Price, it has been said, is a heroine who employs 
"the technique of lying down and going limp."10 And Mansfield 
Park has been described as "The most imaginative and 
accomplished of anti-Jacobin novels."11 The anti-Jacobin novel, 
in turn, is characterized as being deeply suspicious of 
subjectivity; of assertions of the superiority of individual insight 
to social conventions and of feeling to reason and judgment; of 
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the alleged innate goodness of human nature and of any action 
or attitude which might conceivably undermine marriage, 
religion, established morality, community—in favor of a selfish 
individualism which simply pursues self-gratification.12 But 
Mansfield Park is far too complex a novel to be neatly 
categorized, or enlisted in ideological crusades. It is true that 
the Crawfords abundantly illustrate the dangers of "selfish 
individualism which simply pursues self-gratification." But the 
Crawfords are not in the least subjective — it is Fanny who 
displays the deepest feeling in the novel, not only in loving 
Edmund and her brother but in her response to poetry and 
landscape, and this depth of feeling helps to establish her moral 
superiority. In making her refusals, Fanny is guided entirely by 
her individual insight into the real nature of the situations, of 
the personalities involved, and of the relation of moral principle 
to actuality. Freedom itself is not condemned, because (as we 
have seen) Henry Crawford's apparent freedom is shown to be 
useless, even injurious to others. It is necessarily misdirected, 
because Crawford is guided by neither principle nor 
self-knowledge. It is certainly true, as we already have seen, 
that unconditional freedom is never an absolute value in the 
novels, and Jane Austen is ironic at the expense of characters 
who consider any restraint whatever as oppression. After Sir 
Thomas Bertram has put an end to the Mansfield theatricals, 
Mr. Yates reflects that "He had known many disagreeable 
fathers before . . . but never in the whole course of his life, had 
he seen one of that class so unintelligibly moral, so infamously 
tyrannical, as Sir Thomas" (Mansfield Park, p. 191). Yates's 
condemnation is the highest praise. 
Mansfield Park, one might say, is not concerned with freedom 
but with integrity. But of course the two are inseparable, and 
Fanny Price exercises her freedom in preserving her integrity 
— first by refusing to take part in the theatricals, then by 
refusing to marry Crawford (which involves refusing Sir 
Thomas Bertram as well, when he urges her to accept). 
Mansfield Park presents not the development of a personality 
but its conservation, and it is a mistake to consider the novel as a 
"dramatization of Fanny Price's education."13 Fanny's struggle 
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is not to become a particular kind of person, but to remain what 
she is against various pressures and temptations. By the time 
the major action commences she has learned almost everything 
she needs to know. She has learned the lessons of Mansfield 
Park, and has surpassed her teachers. She is as principled as 
Edmund or Sir Thomas and more consistent than either 
(Edmund being blinded at times by his love for Mary Crawford 
and Sir Thomas by a concern for worldly interests), as well as 
keener in her judgment of character. 
Fanny's refusal of Crawford (refusals, one should say, since he 
is persistent) does not seriously test her, as she has no liking or 
respect for him. Her refusal to act in Lovers' Vows is more 
difficult, for it involves not only denying a request from 
Edmund, whom she loves and profoundly admires, but 
implicitly condemns his decision to participate. It is the refusal 
of Sir Thomas that is hardest. This is a negative action to be 
sure, but it seems to achieve moral heroism when we consider 
Fanny's genuine humility and lifelong training in 
submissiveness, the awe in which she holds her uncle, her 
complete dependence on his goodwill, and the cruel dilemma in 
which she is placed. The explanation which would satisfy Sir 
Thomas completely — her observation of Crawford's behavior 
with Maria and Julia — she cannot give. We must remember 
that to Fanny Sir Thomas personifies Society (as far as she 
knows or cares about Society) and Principle. His authority is 
far-reaching and, to her, legitimate. 
Nevertheless she refuses, and in refusing asserts her own 
freedom, and Sir Thomas becomes absurd in his denunication: "I 
had thought you peculiarly free from wilfulness of temper, 
self-conceit, and every tendency to that independence of spirit 
. . . which in young women is offensive and disgusting beyond 
all common offense. But you have now shown me that you can be 
wilful and perverse, that you can and will decide for yourself 
(Mansfield Park, p. 318). Exactly — against all urgings. That 
she can and will decide for herself is the saving of Fanny, in her 
fictional world and as a heroine too. No interest in or sympathy 
for her would be possible if she were only the patient Griselda 
that she sometime seems, if we did not know that, as Mrs. Norris 
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says, "she likes to go her own way to work; she does not like to be 
dictated; she takes her own independent walk whenever she 
can; she certainly has a little spirit of secrecy, and of 
independence and nonsense about her, which I would advise her 
to get the better o f (Mansfield Park, p. 323). Although his 
language is more dignified, Sir Thomas's speech is basically as 
absurd as Mrs. Norris's. Only a fool condemns independence. 
Although Fanny's principles are formed, she does have one 
lesson to learn before she can win the hero. She must overcome 
her excessive humility and learn to rate herself and her claims 
to consideration at their true value. A carefully arranged series 
of episodes teaches this lesson: dinner at the Grants, with the 
unprecedented circumstances of the carriage being sent for her; 
the ball at Mansfield which she leads; Crawford's proposal; the 
visit to her family and assumption of responsibility for guiding 
her younger sister, Susan. When Fanny subscribes to the 
Portsmouth circulating library, she is "amazed at being in 
propria persona, for the first time in her life" (Mansfield Park, p. 
398), but in reality she has already acted far more significantly 
in propria persona by her refusals. 
Mansfield Park, then, dramatizes not the education but the 
individualization of Fanny Price, which might be defined as the 
conscious recognition of what already exists and the defense of 
its integrity. Integrity and self-defense, in the deepest sense, are 
the major concerns of the novel, but freedom is essential, and for 
all her timidity Fanny judges freely and acts upon her 
judgments. And at last, by exercising her freedom in holding 
firm to her principles, Cinderella wins the Prince (that is, Fanny 
marries Edmund Bertram). It is arguable, indeed, that Fanny 
Price enlarges her sphere of action more than any of the other 
heroines. Given the social level from which she begins, her 
eventual union with Edmund is a greater triumph of 
personality over circumstances than Elizabeth's union with 
Darcy. 
To play the role of primary heroine, and hold the reader's 
interest while doing so, a character must possess a certain 
minimum of freedom, must be able to act. Elinor Dashwood's 
complete passivity accounts for the partial failure of Sense and 
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Sensibility; she is the totally passive character that Fanny Price 
sometimes appears to be. The examples of Jane Fairfax and 
Emma Watson (in the fragmentary The Watsons) are relevant 
here. Without rank or money or family, without even the 
security that Fanny derived from Mansfield Park, Jane 
Fairfax's social position is at the opposite extreme from that of 
Emma, the primary heroine. As Emma is entering the world, 
Jane — at exactly the same age—is preparing to withdraw from 
it: "With the fortitude of a devoted noviciate, she had resolved at 
one-and-twenty to complete the sacrifice, and retire from all the 
pleasures of life, of rational intercourse, equal society, peace and 
hope, to penance and mortification forever" (Emma, p. 165). 
After the one action of entering into a secret engagement with 
Frank Churchill, she can only wait for a miracle, which in due 
course happens. Two miracles, in fact, are needed to save her: 
first, Frank's falling in love with and engaging himself to her, 
and second the lucky death of Mr. Churchill, who never would 
have permitted their marriage. Jane is the almost helpless 
victim of her society; the odds against her are insuperable and 
can be overcome only by an act of Providence, not by any 
possible action of her own. For this reason, among others, she 
never challenges Emma's position in the reader's interest, 
although she is undoubtedly the more "admirable" character. 
Emma Watson, if The Watsons had been completed, would have 
been a primary heroine as helpless as Jane (her position would 
have been rather like that of Fanny Price, had Fanny remained 
at Portsmouth with her family instead of being taken back by 
the Bertrams). A heroine suffering continuously "from the 
dreadful mortifications of unequal Society, & family Discord — 
from the immediate endurance of Hard-hearted prosperity, 
low-minded Conceit, & wrong-headed folly" (Minor Works, p. 
361), with no power to relieve those conditions by her own 
actions, is not an appropriate heroine for a Jane Austen novel. 
Comedy is hardly possible under such conditions. (Elizabeth 
Bennet suffers to some extent from unequal society and family 
discord, but to a lesser degree — the difference in degree is 
all-important — and what is more, can exert herself against 
those evils and largely escape them. Fanny Price endures them 
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at Portsmouth, but on a visit which she knows will end.) The 
family tradition that The Watsons was abandoned because Jane 
Austen felt she had placed her heroine in too low a position looks 
plausible. Some power to act seems essential to a heroine of 
comedy; passive endurance seems more appropriate to pathos or 
sentimentality — more appropriate, in short, to the Victorian 
novel. 
If such characters as Emma Watson and Jane Fairfax have 
been deprived of their freedom by the circumstances of their 
situation in society, there is another class who have, in a sense 
voluntarily (though not consciously), deprived themselves of 
freedom in some or all circumstances. These might be called the 
rule-bound characters. Miss Bingley provides a convenient 
example: a lady must never under any circumstances muddy 
her petticoat. Mr. Elton is rule-bound in his proposal to Emma: 
"she found. . . her hand seized — her attention demanded, and 
Mr. Elton actually making violent love to her: availing himself 
of the precious opportunity, declaring sentiments which must be 
already well known, hoping — fearing — adoring — ready to die 
if she refused him; but flattering himself that his ardent 
attachment and unequalled love and unexampled passion could 
not fail of having some effect," etc. (Emma, p. 129). This is love 
by the book — emphasized by the technique of direct discourse, 
which reduces the declaration to its basic clichés — and Elton 
presumably has learned it from plays or novels (bad ones, no 
doubt). Taken literally, almost every word it contains is a lie 
(instead of dying, for example, he marries Augusta Hawkins 
with ten thousand pounds), but for Elton love-making is a ritual 
with its established procedures and language. One does the 
expected thing (seizing the lady's hand) and pronounces the 
expected words, and assumes that the desired result will follow. 
Mr. Collins, on a similar occasion, will not be convinced that 
Elizabeth means her refusal, because for him it is a rule that 
"elegant females" say no at first to increase their lovers' 
suspense (Pride and Prejudice, p. 108). The language of 
sincerity, when Knightley proposes to Emma, is rather 
different: "If I loved you less I might be able to talk about it more 
. . . I have blamed you, and lectured you, and you have borne it 
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as no other woman in England would have borne it" (Emma, p. 
430). Collins is a fool: Elton is ordinarily rational, but in his 
lovemaking has made himself a fool by the use of formulaic 
language entirely inappropriate to the real situation, and by 
doing so has surrendered his own freedom. 
The fool, of course, cannot enjoy freedom in any true sense 
(even when there are no external constraints on his acts) 
because he lacks the power of free and intelligent choice. A life 
devoted wholly to social ritual and governed entirely by its rules 
results in the total inspidity of Lady Middleton in Sense and 
Sensibility or the "heartless elegance" of Sir Walter and 
Elizabeth Elliot in Persuasion, which is so vividly contrasted 
with the spontaneity and emotional freedom of the naval 
characters — Wentworth, Harville, and the Crofts. (Knightley 
displays the same qualities; and it is his ability to rise above 
social rules, to act and speak freely and spontaneously, that 
makes him the most interesting of Jane Austen's heroes.) A life 
lived purely in accordance with the rules is a life of "elegance," 
"prosperity," and "nothingness" (Persuasion, p. 9). Lady 
Catherine de Bourgh obviously is rule-bound (young women 
should always be deferential and yielding, for example). 
Charlotte Lucas, though not a fool, behaves most foolishly. She 
accepts Mr. Collins because'she has already accepted as an 
absolute rule that a single woman must find a husband. Even 
Mary Crawford, who appears to possess an intellectual freedom 
wider than Elizabeth Bennet's, in fact accepts without question 
the standards of fashionable London society. (Thus, her dislike 
for Edmund's intention of becoming a country clergyman is 
based entirely on the low social rating ofthat occupation by her 
own set.) 
Jane Austen's heroines possess a real, although limited, 
freedom. It must be guided by principle if it is to be of value to 
anyone, and to live according to principle requires the exercise 
of free judgment and free choice, and the ability to resist social 
pressures. The novels contain only one example of a heroine who 
yields to such "persuasion" — Anne Elliot, who has realized her 
mistake. As one might expect, however, a balance is enforced. 
Although Anne had surrendered unwisely to "persuasion", the 
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novel does not unreservedly recommend the opposite quality of 
"resolution". It distinguishes, in Johnsonian diction and syntax, 
"between the steadiness of principle and the obstinacy of 
selfwill, between the darings of heedlessness and the resolution 
of a collected mind" (Persuasion, p. 26), and Wentworth must 
learn the difference. Louisa Musgrove (a kind of vulgarized 
Marianne Dashwood, lacking her sincerity and passion) 
elevates resolution into a principle in itself, in large matters and 
small, and makes her dangerous jump down the stairs to the 
Cobb simply because "I am determined I will" (Persuasion, p. 
109). The "universal felicity and advantage of firmness of 
character" (Persuasion, p. 110) is clearly to be doubted. 
Certainly Jane Austen would never endorse the "firmness of 
character" which consists of following every impulse without 
regard for consequences. Carrying this principle to its logical 
conclusion identifies us with the foolish Sir Edward Denham, 
trying to live in obedience to "the sovereign impulses of 
illimitable Ardour" (Minor Works, p. 398). Life cannot be lived 
on a basis either of always giving in to impulse or of always 
resisting it, and neither Persuasion nor Jane Austen's work in 
general supports either side of such a ridiculous and 
unnecessary dichotomy. But Persuasion clearly demonstrates 
how misleading it is to say such things as "What Jane Austen 
most admired was the ability to resist impulse; what Lawrence 
most admired was surrender to it."14 
The novels are on the side of freedom and of emotion, although 
not the unconditional freedom admired by extreme Romantics. 
The liberty enjoyed by Jane Austen's heroines is of a very 
English kind, hedged and bounded by morality, by social 
convention, and by status as determined by money and family. 
That is why the financial position must always be explained; it 
defines the scope of action and the kind of husband society is 
prepared to allow the heroine. But she is not confined to that 
definition. Each heroine has an area of freedom which she 
significantly enlarges in the course of the novel (or, in the case of 
Emma Woodhouse, achieves a self-understanding which gives 
meaning to her initial freedom). There is, of course, a necessary 
minimum of comfort and independence. Jane Austen's pen does 
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not dwell on scenes of guilt and misery, or of grinding poverty 
either. It is no wonder that in The Watsons the husband-hunting 
game is played so ferociously when the penalty of failure 
appears to be a lifetime of wretchedness. But the stakes are too 
high for comedy. 
The limited freedom which the heroines of the completed 
novels possess is no less real because of its limits; in fact, they 
make it credible (and in life the possibility of unlimited choice 
usually bewilders and frustrates). The social world of the novels 
may be narrow, its manners and morals may seem rigid, but it is 
a world on a human scale and it is comprehensible. Knowing its 
restrictions, the heroines are able to act appropriately within 
those limits and occasionally to go beyond them, to preserve or 
in part create their individuality and to satisfy their desires. 
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